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A NOTE ON “VOLUNTARY” VERSUS
“INVOLUNTARY” RISKS
CASS R. SUNSTEIN*
Ordinary people seem to perceive voluntarily incurred risks as
less troublesome than involuntarily incurred risks. Consider the di-
verse public reactions to airplane crashes and automobile crashes.
Or consider the fact that tobacco is by far the largest source of pre-
ventable deaths in the United States. Why do we not devote much
more of our regulatory effort to reducing smoking? The reason seems
to lie in a judgment that smoking is a voluntary activity, and hence,
the resulting deaths are less troublesome than are other sorts of
deaths. People have voluntarily assumed the relevant risks. This idea
helps account for the fact that the government devotes relatively little
in the way of resources to control not only smoking, but also to com-
bat the habits of poor diet and insufficient exercise, which produce at
least 300,000 premature deaths every year.
The distinction between voluntary and involuntary risk may well
be the central element in the difference between lay and expert
judgments about risk. Experts tend to focus on aggregate lives at
stake; lay people care a great deal whether a risk is undertaken vol-
untarily. Their concern on this score seems quite reasonable, in part
because it accords so well with widespread intuitions. But my basic
claim here is otherwise. I suggest that judgments about whether a risk
is “involuntary” often stem from confusion and selective attention,
and that the real basis for such judgments frequently lies in an ante-
cedent judgment of some other kind. It is important to identify and
defend such judgments.
More generally, and more importantly, I contend that the effort
to exempt “voluntary” risks from governmental concern—
undoubtedly a response to the public demand for regulation—results
in hundreds of thousands of unnecessary and preventable deaths each
year. If the government focused its attention on more of the suppos-
edly “voluntary” causes of death—consider smoking, poor diet and
exercise, and automobile accidents—it could save an enormous num-
ber of lives, and it could do so at a relatively low cost.
*  Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chi-
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I.  PUZZLES
It is tempting to think that the apparent lay preference for ac-
cording greater weight to “involuntary” risks to life requires signifi-
cant qualification of any criterion that experts may use, such as lives
or life-years saved. But a simple reference to voluntariness, if taken
to suggest something special about “lay rationality,” raises many puz-
zles. The most important problem is that it is not simple to know
when a risk is voluntarily incurred. “Voluntariness” may be entirely
absent in the case of an unforeseeable collision with an asteroid; but
voluntariness is not, in cases of environmental, occupational, or most
other social risks, an all-or-nothing matter. Instead it is a matter of
degree. Return to the conventional thought that airplane crashes are
“involuntary” and automobile crashes more “voluntary.” Certainly it
would be possible to see the risks from air travel as voluntarily run;
people have a choice about whether to fly, and when they do fly, they
pay a certain amount for a certain package, including risks of various
sorts. The same is true of automobile safety—and it is not in any way
less true, however disparately the two kinds of risks may “seem.”
Perhaps people are responding to the perceived fact that they have
no control over the pilot’s behavior, whereas they have considerable
control over automobile safety since they are themselves drivers. But
airlines respond to market forces, including the market for safety,
and many people injured in automobile accidents are not at fault.
Thus, along the dimension of voluntariness, this is hardly a crisp dis-
tinction. The difference between the two risks is hardly so categorical
as to justify an assessment that they fall on poles of some voluntari-
ness-involuntariness divide. Indeed, it is not clear even what is meant
by the suggestion that one is voluntary and the other is not. Some-
thing else appears to underlie that suggestion.
II.  THREE CASES: INFORMATION, CONTRACT, AND COST
To shed some light on the issue, consider three classes of cases.
First, consider the question whether workers exposed to cancer risks
are voluntarily or involuntarily so exposed. If workers do not know
about such risks—if they lack relevant information—we seem to have
an easy case of involuntariness. Thus it makes sense to say that risks
are run involuntarily when the people running them do not know
about them. Lack of adequate information provides a legitimate case
for a judgment of involuntary exposure to risk. But of course, infor-
mation itself can be obtained at some cost, pecuniary or otherwise. In
Fall 1997] VOLUNTARY VERSUS INVOLUNTARY RISKS 175
cases of this kind, we are thus dealing with high costs of risk avoid-
ance, in the distinctive form of high (sometimes prohibitively high)
costs of acquiring relevant information.
Second, suppose that people who are exposed to a certain risk
are aware of the risk, but are not in a contractual relation with the
risk-producer. Many victims of pollution are in this position; recall
that in surveys air pollution is a particular source of public concern.
People in Los Angeles may well know that they face high levels of
smog. Are they exposed involuntarily? In a way the answer is yes; but
they can take steps to reduce the risks associated with exposure to
smog, by (among other things) moving away. If we conclude that
people in Los Angeles are involuntarily exposed to air pollution
risks, we may mean that a risk is incurred involuntarily when and in
the sense that it is typically very expensive for people to avoid it—
and when someone else can reduce the risks more cheaply. Here a
claim that the risk is faced “involuntarily” may mean that those who
“run” the risk can reduce it only at very high cost, at least compared
to those who “produce” the risk. (The quotation marks are necessary
for Coasian reasons; the existence of the risk is attributable to the
acts and omissions of people on both sides.)1 Or it is possible that we
mean that on nonutilitarian grounds, the people exposed to the risk
have a moral entitlement to be free from it, at least if they have not
explicitly sold it.
But turn now to a third class of cases, involving a wage package
or contract that does include compensation for the relevant risks. As-
suming that point, we might want to distinguish between two differ-
ent possibilities. In a case of a high-level scientist, knowledgeable
about relevant risks and involved in work that he finds rewarding,
people may well conclude that we have an instance of voluntariness
(in the same category can be found the case of an astronaut). But
people might not say the same about a low-level worker who does not
like his work at all.2 What distinguishes the two cases? If knowledge
is present, or if the compensation package includes payment for the
relevant risk, it is not clear how the two differ. The underlying judg-
ment must be that the compensation is inadequate, perhaps because
background inequality has produced a wage package that seems un-
fair even if voluntarily chosen by the parties.
1. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (1988).
2. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 199-200 (1993).
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From this discussion it seems reasonable to speculate that any
judgment that a risk is run “involuntarily” is probably based on: (1) a
lack of knowledge of the risk, or, more accurately, the high costs of
obtaining information about the risk; (2) a belief that, despite ade-
quate information, it would be very costly for people to avoid the
risk; or (3) a belief that the risk is unaccompanied by compensating
benefits, notwithstanding the belief that the contract is in some sense
worth signing. It may seem hard to make sense of the third ground. If
people have signed the contract with full information, in what sense
can the risk be denominated involuntary? What might be at work is a
judgment that background inequalities are producing the relevant
bargain (not by itself a good reason to disrupt the deal, because any
such disruption will not respond to the inequalities and may even
make those who are badly off worse off). Or perhaps there is a belief
that workers are competing to their collective detriment, and an
agreement not to compete would be in their best interests.3
On this view, the question whether a risk is run voluntarily or
not is often not a categorical one but instead a question of degree, as-
sociated with information costs, risk-reduction costs, and the exis-
tence or not of accompanying benefits. Of course there are interest-
ing background questions about why and when a risk “codes” as
voluntary or involuntary; undoubtedly the answer depends a great
deal on heuristic devices used by ordinary people, and also on selec-
tive attention, as people focus on a single aspect of a complex trans-
action or set of events.
III.  PURPOSES, RESPONSIBILITY, BLAME
Risks may seem “voluntarily” run when people do not approve
of the purpose for which people run the relevant risks, and involun-
tarily run when people think that the purpose for which the risk is run
is laudable. It is predictable that people will not want to pour enor-
mous taxpayer resources into lowering the risks associated with sky-
diving, even if the dollars/life-years saved ratio is quite good.  By con-
trast, it is doubtful that people think that it is wrong to spend
enormous resources on the prevention of death from childbirth or
from being a police officer, even though the decision to have a child
is (with appropriate qualifications) voluntary, as is the decision to be-
come a police officer.
3. See ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND 176-77 (1985).
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There is a related point. People may think that when the appeal
or purpose of the activity is associated with its very riskiness, re-
sources should not be devoted to risk-reduction. At least this is plau-
sible when the risk is an independent good or part of the benefit of
the activity. It is easy to imagine a belief that some activities—unsafe
sex, cigarette smoking—can be treated like the skydiving case, per-
haps because the risks are sometimes part of the benefit, or because
the risks are not incurred for a purpose that observers find worthy or
valuable.
It might seem that this consideration—the purpose for which the
risk is incurred—overlaps with or is even identical to the question
whether there are high costs of risk-avoidance. When the costs are
low, as in skydiving, the purpose might seem inadequate. But on re-
flection, the two ideas are hardly the same; these are quite different
moral intuitions. It may well be that failing to skydive, or skydiving
with some safety-increasing technology, imposes high costs on sky-
divers. There seems to be an objective judgment, not necessarily con-
nected with subjective costs, in the claim that some risks are volun-
tary, or deserve less attention, because they are run for inadequate
purposes.
Relatedly, airplane accidents may seem different from automo-
bile accidents not because the former are less voluntary, and not be-
cause of the diverse costs of risk avoidance, but because the victims
of airplane accidents are less blameworthy than the victims of auto-
mobile accidents in the sense that any death or injury is not a product
of their own negligence or misconduct. In the case of an airplane dis-
aster, weather conditions, mechanical failure, or pilot error are likely
causes; in the case of an automobile accident, it is more likely
(though not of course certain) that the victim could have avoided
death through more careful driving. The point is crude, since many
victims of automobile accidents are not drivers, and many drivers in
accidents do not behave negligently. But the perceived difference, in
a significant number of cases, may underlie an apparent judgment of
“voluntariness” that is really a judgment about responsibility and
blameworthiness. These judgments must of course be defended and
earned.
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IV.  UNDERLYING QUESTIONS AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK
We might therefore conclude that whether a risk qualifies as
voluntary raises many of the questions raised by the question
whether the government should regulate the market at all. A risk
might be characterized as involuntarily run because affected people
lack relevant information; because the transactions costs of bargain-
ing are high; because the risks should be seen to amount to externali-
ties; because collective action problems make market outcomes un-
satisfactory since (for example) workers are in a prisoner’s dilemma
best solved through law; or because some motivational or cognitive
defect makes successful solutions through markets unlikely.4 These of
course are among the conventional grounds for regulation in the first
instance. When a risk seems voluntary, and not worthy of substantial
regulatory resources, the term “voluntary” may well be serving as a
placeholder for an argument that there is no sufficient ground for
governmental action.  This may occur because the accompanying
benefits are high or the risk-reduction costs are low, and because
market arrangements take adequate account of these facts.
But there are many problems here. Should voluntarily run risks
of death or injury receive no public attention, on the ground that the
relevant people have already received compensation? The puzzle lies
in the fact that it is hard to know when and how a risk is voluntarily
run, in such a way as to make a government role inadvisable. Suppose
that we consider a risk of death or injury to be incurred voluntarily
when an informed person decided to incur it in light of its costs and
benefits. Suppose, for example, that someone purchases a small car
knowing that it is equipped with fewer safety features, or decides to
become a boxer, an astronaut, or a police officer in a dangerous
neighborhood. If a death results from such a choice, it might seem
that the chooser has no legitimate ground for complaint; there has
been ex ante compensation for the risk. But even in such cases, it is
not clear that the government lacks a role. If the government can re-
duce a serious risk at low cost, and thus eliminate deaths, it should do
so even when there is ex ante compensation for the relevant risk. The
fact that someone voluntarily ran the risk, in one respect, is no reason
not to reduce that very risk. Suppose that the government can reduce
4. See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
1997).
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the relevant risks in such a way as to survive any cost-benefit test.
Why should it not do so?
The general point is that observers frequently confuse two quite
different questions: (1) should people be banned from running a cer-
tain risk when they have run that risk voluntarily? and (2) should the
government attempt to reduce a certain risk when people have run
that risk voluntarily? A negative answer to the first question does not
answer the second question. People may run a risk voluntarily, but
also be better off when that risk is reduced. They are hardly hypo-
critical or confused when they seek the government to help in risk
reduction. They may well say that they acted voluntarily, but that
they did not voluntarily run the risk, at least in the sense that they
wished it to be lower than it was, and wish it to be lower than it now
is.
V.  A TENTATIVE CONCLUSION
From these points, it should be concluded that a lay judgment
that a risk is “voluntary” should not be decisive for purposes of pol-
icy. Many risks that people consider “voluntary” should be the sub-
ject of greater governmental concern, not least because hundreds of
thousands of lives might thereby be saved. The lay focus on
“involuntary” risks sometimes points to reasonable judgments, but it
is at most a start. The danger of using it as the basis for policy is that
it is, literally, dangerous, in the sense that it ensures that the govern-
ment will do far less than it could to reduce the number of premature
deaths.
In short, there is no special magic in notions like “voluntary” and
“involuntary.” Judgments about the voluntary character of risk often
depend on confusion and selective attention. People often focus on a
small part of a complex interaction—not the decision to fly, but the
accident when it occurs; not the decision to live in a high-polluting
area, but respiratory problems when they are experienced. Risks that
appear involuntarily run can often be redescribed, with some plausi-
bility, as voluntarily run, and the converse is also true. A better un-
derstanding of what factors underlie a judgment about voluntariness
should be used for purposes of regulatory policy. I have attempted to
identify some of the possible factors here.
My basic conclusion is simple: the government should attempt to
save as many lives, or as many life-years, as it can, subject to the lim-
ited public and private resources devoted to risk regulation. Ordinar-
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ily, people’s concern with voluntariness should not allow dramatic
departures from this basic goal, which specifies what the government
is generally trying to increase. The most that can be said is that when
reasonable judgments underlie a judgment that people have been
voluntarily or involuntarily exposed to a risk, the extent of the gov-
ernment’s focus might be adjusted. In other words, the government
might devote more resources to a problem when those at risk lack
relevant information or when the costs of risk-avoidance are espe-
cially high, and it might devote fewer resources to a problem when
those at risk have the information and when the costs of risk-
avoidance are low.
